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Abstract	  
Open-­‐mindedness	  is	  an	  under-­‐explored	  topic	  in	  virtue	  epistemology,	  despite	  its	  
assumed	  importance	  for	  the	  field.	  Questions	  about	  it	  abound	  and	  need	  to	  be	  
answered.	  For	  example,	  what	  sort	  of	  intellectual	  activities	  are	  central	  to	  it?	  Can	  one	  
be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  one's	  firmly	  held	  beliefs?	  Why	  should	  we	  strive	  to	  be	  open-­‐
minded?	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  these	  and	  other	  pertinent	  issues.	  In	  
particular,	  it	  proposes	  a	  view	  that	  construes	  open-­‐mindedness	  as	  engagement,	  that	  
is,	  a	  willingness	  to	  entertain	  novel	  ideas	  in	  one’s	  cognitive	  space	  and	  to	  accord	  them	  
serious	  consideration.	  	  
Keywords:	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  Epistemology;	  Intellectual	  Virtues;	  Character	  
Trait;	  Jason	  Baehr;	  Wayne	  Riggs.	  
1. Introduction
Not	  much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  open-­‐mindedness	  in	  virtue	  epistemology.1	  
This	  apparent	  neglect	  is	  somewhat	  surprising,	  especially	  when	  virtue	  
1	  In	  contrast,	  the	  topic	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  has	  received	  more	  attention	  in	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  education,	  in	  particular,	  from	  William	  Hare	  (e.g.,	  1979,	  1985,	  and	  
2003).	  Much	  of	  his	  work,	  for	  example,	  aims	  to	  defend	  open-­‐mindedness	  as	  an	  
educational	  ideal	  against	  misconceptions	  about	  the	  character	  trait.	  In	  this	  paper,	  
however,	  I	  will	  not	  directly	  address	  Hare’s	  definition	  of	  open-­‐mindedness,	  which	  he	  
construes	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  person’s	  disposition	  to	  revise	  her	  views	  in	  light	  of	  sound	  
objections.	  I	  agree	  with	  Wayne	  Riggs	  that	  this	  broad	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	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epistemologists	  generally	  regard	  open-­‐mindedness	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  
intellectual	  character	  virtues	  (Baehr	  2011;	  Riggs	  2010).	  There	  is	  still	  much	  that	  we	  
do	  not	  know	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	  For	  example,	  what	  sort	  of	  
intellectual	  activities	  are	  central	  to	  it?	  Is	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  
about	  beliefs	  which	  she	  holds	  firmly?	  Why	  should	  we	  strive	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded?	  
This	  paper	  aims	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  these	  and	  other	  pertinent	  issues.	  In	  particular,	  it	  
argues	  for	  a	  view	  that	  construes	  open-­‐mindedness	  as	  engagement,	  that	  is,	  a	  
willingness	  to	  make	  room	  for	  novel	  ideas	  in	  one’s	  cognitive	  space	  and	  to	  give	  them	  
serious	  consideration.	  	  
The	  discussion	  will	  be	  structured	  as	  follows:	  First,	  I	  will	  examine	  two	  accounts	  of	  
open-­‐mindedness	  that	  have	  been	  proposed	  in	  virtue	  epistemology.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  
highlight	  what	  their	  proponents	  regard	  as	  genuine	  conditions	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  
and	  to	  identify	  some	  of	  the	  central	  desiderata	  required	  for	  a	  satisfactory	  theory	  of	  
open-­‐mindedness.	  I	  will	  then	  formulate	  a	  preliminary	  counter-­‐argument	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  accounts	  is	  capable	  of	  satisfying	  one	  another’s	  
desideratum.	  Second,	  I	  will	  explain	  what	  it	  is	  to	  construe	  open-­‐mindedness	  as	  
engagement,	  and	  argue	  that,	  of	  all	  the	  known	  approaches,	  engagement	  constitutes	  
the	  conceptual	  core	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	  I	  conclude	  by	  showing	  how	  my	  account	  
can	  satisfy	  the	  desiderata	  for	  open-­‐mindedness	  in	  the	  other	  accounts	  to	  be	  dealt	  
with	  here.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intellectual	  virtue	  “seems	  nothing	  short	  of	  rationality	  itself”	  (2010,	  p.	  179),	  and	  with	  
Jason	  Baehr	  that	  its	  focus	  tends	  to	  be	  on	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  cases	  of	  open-­‐
mindedness	  (i.e.,	  mostly	  conflict-­‐based	  scenarios	  and	  at	  times,	  a	  position	  of	  
neutrality)(2011,	  pp.	  192-­‐4).	  Moreover,	  the	  objections	  I	  raise	  against	  Riggs’s	  and	  
Baehr’s	  views	  can,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  apply	  to	  Hare’s,	  as	  well.	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2.	  Two	  Accounts	  of	  Open-­‐Mindedness	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  two	  most	  developed	  accounts	  of	  open-­‐
mindedness	  in	  character-­‐based	  virtue	  epistemology	  (Baehr	  2011;	  Riggs	  2010),	  or	  
what	  Guy	  Axtell	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘virtue	  responsibilist’	  epistemologies	  (Axtell	  1997).	  
Both	  consider	  open-­‐mindedness	  a	  character	  trait,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  sub-­‐personal	  state	  
like	  a	  cognitive	  faculty,	  ability,	  skill,	  or	  capacity.	  According	  to	  Jason	  Baehr,	  open-­‐
mindedness	  is	  a	  character	  trait	  that	  “necessarily	  makes	  certain	  demands	  on	  its	  
possessor’s	  agency”	  (Baehr	  2011,	  p.	  204).	  In	  Wayne	  Riggs’s	  view,	  open-­‐mindedness	  
posits	  that	  “some	  degree	  of	  agential	  involvement	  is	  necessary	  for	  significant	  
cognitive	  virtue”	  (Riggs	  2010,	  p.	  176).	  What	  sort	  of	  demands,	  then,	  does	  open-­‐
mindedness	  make	  on	  an	  agent,	  and	  how	  does	  an	  agent’s	  involvement	  turn	  open-­‐
mindedness	  into	  an	  intellectual	  virtue?	  Once	  these	  questions	  are	  addressed,	  I	  will	  
then	  advance	  a	  preliminary	  argument	  to	  show	  that	  these	  accounts	  fail	  to	  meet	  one	  
another’s	  desideratum.	  This	  will	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  next	  section,	  in	  which	  I	  
propose	  a	  view	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  that	  can,	  among	  other	  things,	  satisfy	  the	  
desiderata	  of	  both	  of	  these	  accounts.	  	  
Riggs	  develops	  his	  view	  primarily	  out	  of	  concern	  for	  certain	  puzzles	  that	  
arise	  from	  questions	  related	  to	  open-­‐mindedness	  (ibid.).	  One	  puzzle	  of	  particular	  
concern	  to	  him	  stems	  from	  the	  two-­‐part	  query	  raised	  by	  Jonathan	  Adler:	  “How	  can	  
one	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  a	  strongly	  held	  belief;	  and	  why	  should	  one?”	  (Riggs,	  p.	  
179;	  Adler	  2004,	  p.	  123).	  Briefly,	  it	  seems	  incompatible	  that	  one	  can	  possess	  a	  
strongly	  held	  belief,	  say	  p,	  and	  yet,	  can	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  other	  views	  that	  stand	  
	   4	  
opposed	  to	  it.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  believe	  p	  strongly	  is	  to	  believe	  it	  with	  conviction.	  
On	  the	  other,	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  its	  alternative	  ~p	  suggests	  that	  one	  has	  
doubts	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  p.	  How,	  then,	  is	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  
about	  p	  while	  believing	  it	  strongly?	  I	  shall	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  compatibility	  problem.	  
To	  solve	  this	  puzzle,	  Riggs	  appeals	  to	  Adler’s	  definition	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	  
According	  to	  Adler,	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  understood	  as	  “a	  second	  order	  attitude	  
toward	  one’s	  beliefs	  as	  believed,	  and	  not	  just	  toward	  the	  specific	  proposition	  
believed”	  (Riggs,	  p.	  130).	  To	  be	  open-­‐minded	  in	  this	  sense,	  Riggs	  explains,	  is	  “to	  be	  
aware	  of	  one’s	  fallibility	  as	  a	  believer,	  and	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  
possibility	  that	  anytime	  one	  believes	  something,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  one	  is	  wrong”	  
(ibid.,	  original	  italics).	  Put	  this	  way,	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  p	  is	  not	  to	  entertain	  
doubts	  about	  its	  truth	  but	  to	  take	  challenges	  against	  it	  seriously	  (i.e.,	  give	  ~p	  serious	  
consideration)	  and	  to	  recognize	  the	  possibility	  that	  one	  could	  have	  made	  a	  mistake	  
in	  arriving	  at	  p.	  As	  Riggs	  notes,	  since	  this	  willingness	  to	  take	  challenges	  seriously	  is	  
compatible	  with	  one’s	  believing	  in	  p	  strongly,	  the	  puzzle	  is	  thus	  dispelled.	  	  
Riggs,	  however,	  does	  not	  think	  that	  Adler’s	  definition	  is	  sufficient.	  To	  him,	  it	  
fails	  to	  explain	  how	  open-­‐mindedness	  as	  an	  attitude	  is	  “efficacious	  in	  our	  cognitive	  
lives”,	  that	  is,	  how	  it	  “intrude[s]	  upon	  our	  habits	  of	  thought	  consistently	  and	  
productively	  to	  produce	  the	  cognitive	  and	  overt	  ‘behavior’	  typical	  of	  those	  we	  take	  
to	  exemplify	  open-­‐mindedness”	  (Riggs,	  p.	  182).	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  an	  “otherwise	  virtuous	  believer”,	  that	  is,	  a	  cognitive	  agent	  who	  has	  
“mastered	  the	  other	  cognitive	  virtues”	  (ibid.).	  As	  Riggs	  notes,	  such	  a	  believer’s	  
engagement	  with	  less	  virtuous	  agents	  would	  likely	  be	  a	  waste	  of	  her	  time	  and	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mislead	  her	  “into	  exchanging	  a	  truth	  for	  a	  falsehood”	  (ibid.).	  What	  reason,	  then,	  
would	  such	  a	  believer	  have	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded?	  I	  shall	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  
motivational	  problem.	  
Riggs’s	  solution	  is	  to	  supplement	  Adler’s	  definition	  with	  two	  “characteristics	  
of	  thought”	  that	  a	  person	  must	  acquire	  in	  order	  to	  be	  genuinely	  open-­‐minded.	  
According	  to	  him,	  this	  person	  must	  first	  gain	  self-­‐knowledge	  about	  her	  own	  
cognitive	  weakness	  or	  bad	  habits	  of	  thought	  that	  might	  prevent	  her	  from	  seeing	  the	  
truth	  of	  opposing	  views.	  She	  must	  then	  ‘self-­‐monitor’	  for	  signs	  of	  these	  weaknesses	  
and	  bad	  habits	  and	  “take	  whatever	  prompted	  these	  habitual	  responses	  seriously”	  
(Riggs,	  p.	  183).	  According	  to	  Riggs,	  once	  we	  acquire	  these	  two	  characteristics	  of	  
thought,	  our	  awareness	  of	  our	  own	  epistemic	  fallibility	  deepens	  and	  places	  us	  in	  a	  
better	  position	  to	  correct	  these	  weaknesses	  and	  bad	  habits	  and	  thereby,	  increases	  
our	  chance	  of	  getting	  to	  the	  truth.	  This	  is	  how	  the	  aforementioned	  virtuous	  believer	  
can	  allow	  open-­‐mindedness	  to	  inform	  or	  shape	  her	  habits	  of	  thought	  and	  produce	  
relevant	  behaviors,	  for	  even	  she	  will	  have	  cognitive	  biases	  and	  blind	  spots.	  
Riggs’s	  account,	  in	  my	  view,	  falls	  short	  of	  giving	  us	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  open-­‐
mindedness.	  Stressing,	  as	  it	  does,	  an	  agent’s	  fallibility,	  its	  primary	  focus	  is	  on	  open-­‐
mindedness	  that	  is	  conflict-­‐oriented.	  However,	  not	  all	  cases	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  
involve	  a	  conflict	  with	  or	  challenge	  to	  cherished	  beliefs.	  Here	  is	  an	  example	  from	  
Jason	  Baehr.	  
	  
Imagine,	  for	  instance,	  an	  honest	  and	  impartial	  judge	  preparing	  to	  hear	  the	  
opening	  arguments	  in	  a	  particular	  trial.	  The	  judge	  has	  no	  prior	  opinions	  or	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biases	  about	  any	  part	  of	  the	  case;	  nor	  does	  she	  have	  any	  stake	  in	  its	  outcome.	  
There	  is,	  then,	  no	  conflict	  between	  the	  beliefs	  of	  the	  judge	  and	  the	  beliefs	  or	  
argument	  she	  is	  preparing	  to	  hear.	  Nonetheless	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  judge	  might	  
still	  listen	  to	  the	  arguments	  in	  an	  open-­‐minded	  way	  or	  that	  she	  might	  
conduct	  an	  open-­‐minded	  inquiry	  into	  the	  case	  (Baehr	  2011,	  p.	  194).	  	  
	  
As	  Baehr	  notes,	  the	  judge	  is	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  opening	  arguments;	  she	  
need	  not	  set	  aside	  any	  of	  her	  beliefs	  since	  none	  of	  them	  (significant	  or	  not)	  is	  
challenged	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  trial.	  Since	  Riggs’s	  construal	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  
built	  on	  the	  requirement	  that	  a	  person	  take	  challenges	  to	  her	  beliefs	  seriously,	  it	  
therefore	  does	  not	  account	  for	  cases	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  that	  are	  conflict-­‐free.	  
There	  is,	  however,	  a	  way	  for	  Riggs	  to	  get	  around	  this	  worry.	  He	  could	  concede	  that	  
open-­‐mindedness	  does	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  taking	  challenges,	  and	  that	  the	  
remaining	  requirements	  of	  his	  view	  (i.e.,	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  self-­‐monitoring)	  can	  be	  
used	  to	  explain	  the	  judge’s	  disposition.	  Thus,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  strive	  to	  be	  as	  impartial	  
and	  fair	  as	  possible,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  judge	  has	  hitherto	  spent	  much	  time	  
reflecting	  on	  her	  own	  epistemic	  practices.	  She	  knows	  exactly	  what	  her	  cognitive	  
weaknesses	  are	  and	  when	  they	  tend	  to	  arise,	  and	  monitors	  their	  occurrences	  
whenever	  she	  finds	  herself	  in	  such	  cognitive	  contexts.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  her	  self-­‐
knowledge	  and	  self-­‐monitoring,	  the	  judge	  thus	  knows	  exactly	  what	  it	  will	  take	  for	  
her	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  at	  the	  trial.	  Riggs’s	  account	  can	  seemingly	  be	  modified	  to	  
include	  conflict-­‐free	  cases	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	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Unfortunately,	  the	  modified	  account	  is	  still	  not	  sufficient.	  According	  to	  Baehr,	  
there	  are	  cases	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  in	  which	  the	  agent	  is	  not	  required	  to	  perform	  
any	  rational	  assessment	  at	  all.	  As	  he	  writes:	  
	  
Imagine	  a	  physics	  teacher	  who	  has	  just	  led	  a	  group	  of	  bright	  high	  school	  
students	  through	  a	  unit	  on	  Einstein’s	  Special	  Theory	  of	  Relativity.	  Most	  of	  the	  
students	  have	  managed	  to	  follow	  the	  teacher’s	  lessons	  and	  thus	  have	  
achieved	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  the	  theory.	  In	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  course,	  
the	  teacher	  intends	  to	  push	  his	  students	  a	  significant	  step	  further	  by	  
introducing	  them	  to	  Einstein’s	  General	  Theory.	  This	  is	  bound	  to	  pose	  a	  major	  
challenge	  for	  most	  of	  the	  students	  in	  the	  class	  …	  Here	  again	  it	  is	  extremely	  
plausible	  to	  think	  that	  the	  persons	  in	  question	  might	  benefit	  from	  a	  kind	  of	  
open-­‐mindedness	  (Baehr,	  p.	  196).	  	  
	  
Here,	  Baehr	  thinks	  that	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  open-­‐mindedness	  can	  also	  bear	  on	  the	  
process	  of	  understanding.	  In	  order	  to	  comprehend	  the	  “complex	  and	  mind-­‐bending”	  
aspects	  of	  Einstein’s	  General	  Theory,	  the	  students	  have	  to	  “open	  their	  minds”	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  they	  have	  to	  loosen	  their	  grip	  on	  their	  “ordinary	  and	  commonsense	  ways	  
of	  thinking	  about	  the	  world”	  (Baehr,	  p.	  197).	  Baehr	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  
maintaining	  a	  tight	  grip	  on	  these	  ordinary	  ways	  of	  thinking	  will	  close	  their	  minds	  
off,	  making	  their	  minds	  incapable	  of	  stretching	  their	  parameters	  to	  accommodate	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Einstein’s	  General	  theory.2	  While	  Riggs’s	  modified	  account	  plausibly	  applies	  to	  the	  
judge,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  it	  does	  to	  the	  science	  students.	  Unlike	  the	  judge,	  it	  is	  
doubtful	  that	  the	  students	  have	  made	  it	  a	  habit	  to	  reflect	  on	  their	  epistemic	  practices	  
to	  a	  comparable	  extent.	  They	  are	  just	  as	  unlikely	  to	  be	  moved	  by	  their	  “awareness	  of	  
[their]	  own	  fallibility	  to	  search	  for	  domains	  and	  situations	  in	  which	  [they	  are]	  prone	  
to	  these	  habits	  of	  thought	  that	  produce	  closed-­‐mindedness”	  (Riggs,	  p.	  183).	  Despite	  
the	  absence	  of	  these	  two	  characteristics	  of	  thought,	  that	  is,	  a	  habitual	  reflection	  on	  
epistemic	  practice	  and	  a	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  fallibility,	  the	  students	  from	  Baehr’s	  
example	  can	  still	  be	  regarded	  as	  “opening	  their	  minds”	  as	  they	  try	  to	  grapple	  with	  
Einstein’s	  General	  Theory.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  students	  have	  
developed	  an	  awareness	  of	  their	  epistemic	  practices	  and	  epistemic	  flaws.	  The	  point,	  
rather,	  is	  that	  they	  need	  not	  have.	  As	  such,	  Riggs’s	  two	  characteristics	  of	  thought	  are	  
not	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  genuine	  open-­‐mindedness.	  	  
Let	  us	  now	  consider	  Baehr’s	  definition	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	  Baehr’s	  central	  
concern	  is	  to	  uncover	  the	  conceptual	  core	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  that	  unites	  the	  
diverse	  examples	  described	  above.	  He	  construes	  an	  open-­‐minded	  person	  as	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Here	  is	  a	  better	  way	  to	  illustrate	  Baehr’s	  point.	  Suppose	  a	  person	  occupying	  a	  
privileged	  social	  position	  is	  attempting	  to	  understand	  the	  ‘lived	  experience’	  of	  
members	  from	  an	  oppressed	  group.	  She	  can	  do	  so	  in	  an	  open-­‐minded	  or	  a	  closed-­‐
minded	  way.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  that	  she	  looks	  at	  the	  matter	  in	  a	  superficial	  
and	  facile	  manner,	  and	  summarily	  dismisses	  the	  alternative	  lived	  experiences	  as	  
impossible,	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  that	  she	  recognizes	  them	  to	  be	  possible,	  denounces	  them	  
as	  incoherent	  or	  absurd.	  By	  contrast,	  someone	  who	  is	  open-­‐minded	  will	  treat	  the	  
issue	  more	  seriously.	  She	  may	  come	  to	  recognize	  that	  her	  previous	  biases	  and	  
prejudices,	  and	  her	  assumptions	  about	  class	  and	  privilege	  have	  actually	  prevented	  
her	  from	  seeing	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  oppressed;	  she	  may	  thus	  make	  a	  conscious	  
effort	  to	  transcend	  (or	  detach	  or	  loosen	  herself	  from)	  them	  so	  as	  to	  make	  room	  for	  a	  
fresh	  perspective.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  describe	  her	  transcendence	  of	  
her	  usual	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  class	  and	  privilege,	  and	  her	  commitment	  to	  give	  
the	  issue	  serious	  consideration,	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	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who	  “is	  characteristically	  (a)	  willing	  and	  (within	  limits)	  able	  (b)	  to	  transcend	  a	  
default	  cognitive	  standpoint	  (c)	  in	  order	  to	  take	  up	  or	  take	  seriously	  the	  merits	  of	  
(d)	  a	  distinct	  cognitive	  standpoint”	  (Baehr,	  p.	  202).	  To	  elaborate,	  a	  default	  cognitive	  
standpoint	  is	  what	  a	  person	  holds	  or	  accepts	  (or	  in	  some	  cases,	  is	  tempted	  or	  
inclined	  to	  hold)	  when	  she	  is	  confronted	  with	  a	  distinct	  standpoint.	  Accordingly,	  the	  
most	  important	  characteristic	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  –	  what	  Baehr	  calls	  the	  
‘conceptual	  core’	  -­‐	  is	  that	  a	  person	  is	  able	  to	  ‘move	  beyond’	  this	  default	  or	  privileged	  
standpoint	  so	  as	  to	  give	  the	  distinct	  standpoint	  fair	  and	  serious	  consideration.	  A	  
crucial	  implication	  then	  is	  that	  such	  consideration	  is	  possible	  only	  if	  she	  distances	  
herself	  from	  her	  default	  cognitive	  standpoint.	  Thus,	  the	  person	  who	  faces	  a	  
challenge	  to	  her	  beliefs	  should	  ‘set	  aside’	  or	  ‘loosen	  her	  grip’	  on	  her	  default	  position	  
before	  she	  can	  seriously	  take	  up	  or	  assess	  the	  opposing	  view.	  In	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
judge	  given	  above,	  in	  order	  to	  refrain	  from	  making	  a	  hasty	  decision	  and	  to	  remain	  
neutral,	  she	  may	  have	  to	  ‘detach’	  herself	  from	  or	  ‘transcend’	  the	  generalization	  that	  
she	  is	  tempted	  by	  her	  default	  cognitive	  standpoint	  to	  make,	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  assess	  
the	  evidence	  impartially	  and	  comprehensively.	  	  
However,	  Baehr’s	  definition	  of	  open-­‐mindedness,	  I	  contend,	  also	  falls	  short	  of	  
being	  adequate.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  it	  can	  offer	  a	  satisfactory	  solution	  to	  Riggs’s	  
puzzle	  about	  the	  open-­‐minded	  firm	  believer.	  Baehr	  does	  not	  explicitly	  address	  this	  
puzzle,	  but	  a	  possible	  response	  may	  be	  derived	  from	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  conditions	  
when	  a	  person	  should	  be	  open-­‐minded.	  In	  conflict-­‐based	  cases,	  Baehr	  seems	  to	  
think	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  when	  being	  so	  is	  truth-­‐
conducive.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  person	  has	  solid	  grounds	  for	  her	  belief	  p,	  is	  reliable	  in	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her	  judgments	  related	  to	  p,	  but	  has	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  source	  of	  
not-­‐p,	  then	  it	  would	  not	  be	  reasonable	  for	  her	  to	  think	  that	  being	  open-­‐minded	  
would	  bring	  her	  closer	  to	  truth	  (Baehr,	  pp.	  211-­‐2);	  in	  fact,	  being	  open-­‐minded	  might	  
result	  in	  her	  acquiring	  a	  suspect	  viewpoint,	  if	  not	  a	  complete	  falsehood.	  The	  relevant	  
question	  in	  this	  context	  is:	  Should	  she	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  not-­‐p	  if	  the	  example	  is	  
modified	  so	  that	  she	  now	  does	  not	  doubt	  the	  reliability	  of	  its	  source?	  This	  alteration,	  
of	  course,	  is	  simply	  Riggs’s	  puzzle.	  Notice	  that	  an	  appeal	  to	  truth-­‐conduciveness	  will	  
not	  be	  of	  much	  help	  here:	  if	  she	  thinks	  a	  serious	  consideration	  of	  not-­‐p	  will	  help	  her	  
get	  to	  the	  truth,	  then	  this	  suggests	  that	  she	  may	  think	  that	  not-­‐p	  might	  be	  true.	  But	  
this	  in	  turn	  implies	  that	  her	  confidence	  in	  p	  is	  not	  unequivocally	  firm	  to	  begin	  with.	  
Appealing	  to	  truth-­‐conduciveness	  therefore	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  a	  person	  can	  
believe	  p	  firmly	  and	  simultaneously	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  it.	  As	  is,	  Baehr’s	  account	  
does	  not	  readily	  yield	  a	  solution	  to	  Riggs’s	  puzzle.	  	  
To	  summarize,	  the	  foregoing	  discussion	  has	  examined	  two	  views	  of	  open-­‐
mindedness	  that	  identify	  desiderata	  deemed	  crucial	  to	  an	  adequate	  theory	  of	  open-­‐
mindedness.	  I	  have	  argued	  instead	  that	  both	  are	  inadequate	  in	  that	  they	  fail	  to	  
explain	  each	  other’s	  desideratum.	  Riggs’s	  definition	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  all	  the	  
examples	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  that	  Baehr	  discusses,	  and	  Baehr	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  
solution	  to	  Riggs’s	  puzzle	  concerning	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  open-­‐minded,	  yet	  firm	  
believer.	  The	  discussion	  so	  far	  has	  assumed	  that	  the	  identified	  desiderata	  are	  bona	  
fide	  whereas	  it	  could	  perhaps	  be	  argued	  that	  not	  all	  of	  Baehr’s	  examples	  are	  genuine	  
instances	  of	  open-­‐mindedness,	  or	  that	  Riggs’s	  puzzle	  is	  merely	  an	  apparent	  one	  with	  
an	  easy	  solution.	  Space	  does	  not	  allow	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  critique	  of	  these	  views.	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Suffice	  it	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  prima	  facie	  grounds	  for	  thinking	  that	  an	  
alternative	  account	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  will	  be	  more	  satisfactory	  if	  it	  can	  overcome	  
the	  shortcomings	  of	  both	  theories.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  attempt	  such	  an	  account	  
and	  in	  so	  doing,	  hope	  to	  advance	  substantive	  arguments	  that	  address	  the	  core	  issues	  
in	  both	  Riggs’s	  and	  Baehr’s	  theories.	  	  
	  
3.	  Open-­‐Mindedness	  as	  Engagement	  	  
The	  view	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  that	  I	  propose	  can	  be	  stated	  as	  follows:	  a	  
person	  is	  open-­‐minded	  when	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  viewpoint	  that	  is	  novel	  
to	  her.	  In	  other	  words,	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  make	  room	  for	  it	  in	  her	  ‘cognitive	  space’,	  as	  it	  
were,	  and	  to	  see	  how	  it	  might	  relate	  to,	  or	  connect	  with,	  her	  network	  or	  web	  of	  
beliefs.	  Here,	  I	  define	  engagement	  broadly	  to	  encompass	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  cognitive	  
activities.	  It	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  assessment,	  which	  enables	  an	  agent	  to	  evaluate	  the	  
novel	  viewpoint	  in	  the	  light	  of	  relevant	  criterion	  (be	  it	  truth,	  consistency,	  coherence,	  
validity,	  efficacy,	  or	  theoretical	  merits	  like	  explanatory	  scope,	  predictive	  yield,	  and	  
unification).	  It	  can	  also	  refer	  to	  activities	  generally	  subsumed	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  
‘understanding’,	  such	  as	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  viewpoint,	  to	  follow	  the	  
argument	  where	  it	  leads,	  and	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  it	  might	  be	  true	  or	  why	  something	  is	  
false	  or	  senseless.	  Other	  than	  this	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  engagement,	  
there	  are,	  no	  doubt,	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  an	  agent	  can	  relate	  to	  a	  novel	  viewpoint.	  
What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  is	  that	  all	  instances	  of	  engagement	  must	  involve	  an	  
agent’s	  willingness	  to	  invite	  the	  viewpoint	  into	  her	  cognitive	  space,	  and	  to	  connect	  
with	  it	  in	  some	  manner;	  it	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  say	  she	  ‘opens	  up	  her	  mind’	  to	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new	  ideas	  and	  is	  ‘open-­‐minded’.	  By	  contrast,	  to	  refuse	  to	  engage	  in	  any	  of	  these	  
cognitive	  activities	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  novel	  viewpoint	  is	  one	  way	  to	  be	  closed-­‐
minded.	  
Not	  all	  instances	  of	  engagement,	  however,	  count	  as	  open-­‐mindedness.3	  In	  
order	  for	  an	  instance	  to	  count	  as	  such,	  it	  must	  be	  motivated	  in	  the	  right	  way	  and	  
executed	  seriously.	  Specifically,	  an	  open-­‐minded	  person,	  I	  submit,	  must	  be	  
motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  for	  new	  truths	  and	  for	  a	  deeper	  understanding,	  which	  in	  turn	  
drives	  her	  to	  make	  room	  for	  viewpoints	  other	  than	  her	  own	  and	  to	  give	  them	  
serious	  consideration	  (cf.	  Zagzebski	  1996,	  p.	  131	  and	  Baehr	  p.	  202).	  An	  
anthropologist’s	  willingness	  to	  make	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  
native/indigenous	  cosmology	  of	  her	  subjects,	  for	  instance,	  exemplifies	  open-­‐
mindedness	  when	  (1)	  her	  motivation	  for	  doing	  so	  is	  based	  on	  a	  genuine	  desire	  for	  
new	  knowledge	  and	  for	  a	  deepened	  understanding	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  ways	  of	  
thinking	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  universe,	  and	  when	  (2)	  her	  inquiry	  is	  conducted	  in	  
a	  careful,	  fair,	  impartial	  and	  empathetic	  fashion.	  By	  contrast,	  she	  fails	  to	  display	  
open-­‐mindedness	  if	  her	  engagement	  was	  motivated	  instead	  by,	  say,	  the	  mere	  need	  
to	  make	  her	  curriculum	  vitae	  look	  good	  or	  was	  not	  undertaken	  in	  a	  serious	  manner	  
(e.g.,	  she	  is	  quick	  to	  dismiss	  this	  alternative	  cosmology	  as	  irrational	  and	  naïve).	  My	  
use	  of	  “engagement”	  in	  the	  following	  will	  presuppose	  that	  it	  is	  motivated	  in	  the	  right	  
away	  and	  is	  conducted	  in	  a	  serious	  manner.	  
Construing	  engagement	  in	  this	  manner,	  I	  think,	  captures	  something	  intuitive	  
and	  central	  about	  open-­‐mindedness.	  The	  OED	  defines	  ‘open-­‐mindedness’	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  clarifying	  this	  aspect	  of	  my	  
account.	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“[willingness]	  to	  consider	  new	  ideas,”	  while	  the	  Merriam	  Webster	  Dictionary	  
characterizes	  it	  as	  being	  “receptive	  to	  new	  arguments	  or	  ideas”.	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  
diverse	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  person	  can	  consider	  or	  be	  receptive	  to	  new	  ideas.	  By	  
defining	  engagement	  broadly,	  my	  account	  spells	  out	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  an	  
agent	  might	  respond	  to	  new	  ideas.	  Indeed,	  precisely	  because	  of	  its	  broad	  scope,	  my	  
account	  can	  explain	  the	  examples	  of	  the	  three	  kinds	  of	  cognitive	  activities	  that	  Baehr	  
discusses,	  and	  hence,	  can	  satisfy	  his	  desideratum	  for	  open-­‐mindedness.	  What	  all	  of	  
his	  examples	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  the	  agents	  are	  willing	  to	  engage	  with	  novel	  
viewpoints	  in	  a	  manner	  as	  demanded	  by	  the	  epistemic	  context.	  They	  are	  willing	  to	  
invite	  the	  novel	  idea	  or	  argument	  into	  their	  cognitive	  space	  for	  serious	  
consideration.	  Thus,	  in	  conflict-­‐based	  cases	  where	  a	  held	  or	  existing	  viewpoint	  is	  
challenged,	  the	  agent	  is	  willing	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  opposing	  view	  by	  attempting	  to	  
assess	  its	  truth-­‐status	  or	  other	  appropriate	  evaluative	  properties.	  Similarly,	  in	  cases	  
where	  there	  is	  no	  conflict,	  the	  agent	  would	  exercise	  rational	  assessment.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  judge,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  remain	  neutral,	  listens	  to	  the	  opening	  arguments	  
and	  engages	  with	  them	  by	  trying	  to	  determine	  which	  is	  more	  plausible,	  credible,	  
sufficient,	  or	  probable	  in	  setting	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  trial.	  Again,	  which	  set	  of	  criteria	  the	  
judge	  will	  use	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  context	  at	  hand.	  Finally,	  in	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  
require	  any	  such	  rational	  assessment,	  the	  agent’s	  engagement	  may	  take	  any	  of	  the	  
following	  forms:	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  novel	  viewpoint,	  figuring	  out	  how	  it	  can	  be	  
true,	  considering	  its	  application	  to	  the	  relevant	  phenomenon	  in	  question,	  and	  
determining	  its	  compatibility	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  what	  the	  agent	  believes.	  The	  science	  
students	  demonstrate	  open-­‐mindedness	  through	  two	  forms	  of	  engagement:	  first,	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they	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  principles	  and	  predictions	  of	  Einstein’s	  General	  Theory	  of	  
Relativity,	  and	  second,	  they	  decide	  how	  these	  ideas	  might	  fit	  in	  with	  what	  they	  
currently	  believe.	  In	  short,	  engagement	  as	  I	  propose	  here	  can	  accommodate	  all	  of	  
Baehr’s	  examples	  and	  thus,	  satisfy	  his	  desideratum	  for	  open-­‐mindedness.	  	  
An	  important	  difference	  between	  my	  view	  and	  Baehr’s	  is	  that	  mine	  does	  not	  
hold	  cognitive	  transcendence	  as	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  for	  open-­‐mindedness	  
(though	  it	  recognizes	  cognitive	  transcendence	  as	  a	  form	  of	  engagement	  as	  well).	  My	  
view	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  means	  or	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  one	  can	  take	  up	  the	  merit	  of,	  or	  
take	  seriously,	  a	  distinct	  standpoint.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  are	  
other	  means	  or	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  a	  person	  can	  do	  so,	  with	  the	  most	  appropriate	  
or	  effective	  one	  prescribed	  by	  the	  epistemic	  task	  and	  context	  at	  hand.	  As	  I	  will	  
demonstrate	  shortly,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	  engage	  with,	  or	  take	  seriously,	  a	  
novel	  standpoint	  without	  transcending	  her	  default	  cognitive	  standpoint.	  But	  before	  
examining	  such	  a	  possibility,	  I	  want	  to	  explicate	  why	  engagement	  is	  the	  conceptual	  
core	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	  	  
Both	  Riggs	  and	  Baehr	  think	  that	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  intellectually	  virtuous	  
primarily	  because	  it	  is	  truth-­‐conducive.	  According	  to	  Riggs,	  “paying	  attention	  to	  
alternative	  views	  is	  a	  good	  strategy	  to	  discover	  our	  mistaken	  beliefs”	  (Riggs,	  p.	  177),	  
and	  “being	  open-­‐minded	  is	  a	  better	  way	  for	  us	  to	  get	  to	  the	  truth	  than	  the	  
alternative”	  (p.	  178).	  Baehr	  writes,	  a	  “person[’s]…	  engaging	  in	  the	  activity	  
characteristic	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  …	  is	  intellectually	  virtuous	  only	  if	  it	  is	  reasonable	  
for	  [her]	  to	  believe	  that	  engaging	  in	  this	  activity	  …	  may	  be	  helpful	  for	  reaching	  the	  
truth	  (Baehr,	  p.	  210).”	  While	  Riggs	  argues	  that	  the	  truth-­‐conduciveness	  of	  open-­‐
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mindedness	  stems	  from	  a	  person’s	  awareness	  of	  her	  fallibilist	  status	  as	  a	  believer	  
and	  requires	  that	  she	  practice	  the	  two	  characteristics	  of	  thought	  mentioned	  above,	  
Baehr	  attributes	  its	  principal	  facilitation	  to	  a	  person’s	  ability	  to	  transcend	  her	  
default	  cognitive	  standpoint.	  	  
While	  I	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  both	  of	  these	  views,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  either	  is	  
necessary	  for	  open-­‐mindedness.	  Instead,	  what	  is	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  the	  truth-­‐
conduciveness	  of	  open-­‐mindedness,	  and	  what	  underlies	  Riggs’s	  and	  Baehr’s	  
positions,	  is	  engagement.	  That	  is,	  what	  is	  really	  doing	  the	  work	  is	  the	  agent’s	  
willingness	  to	  make	  room	  for	  novel	  ideas	  or	  arguments	  so	  as	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  
relevant	  cognitive	  activity	  as	  prescribed	  by	  the	  context.	  It	  is	  precisely	  because	  she	  is	  
willing	  to	  open	  up	  to	  alternative	  ideas	  and	  arguments	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  then	  to	  
take	  them	  seriously,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  for	  her	  to	  get	  to	  the	  truth	  (or	  to	  detect	  
falsehoods)	  and	  to	  revise	  her	  beliefs	  and	  perspective	  at	  the	  end	  of	  inquiry.	  If	  one	  
were	  not	  willing	  to	  make	  room	  for,	  or	  open	  up	  to,	  these	  ideas,	  and	  to	  treat	  them	  
seriously,	  one	  would	  not	  even	  have	  occasion	  (or	  would	  significantly	  limit	  the	  
opportunity)	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  truth-­‐status	  of	  one’s	  beliefs,	  or	  to	  revise	  them	  so	  as	  to	  
improve	  one’s	  epistemic	  lot.	  This	  ‘making	  room	  for’,	  ‘opening	  up’	  or	  ‘opening	  one’s	  
mind	  to',	  then,	  is	  the	  intellectual	  activity	  that	  is	  unique	  and	  basic	  to	  open-­‐
mindedness	  as	  an	  intellectual	  virtue.	  Understood	  this	  way,	  open-­‐mindedness	  serves	  
as	  a	  gateway,	  with	  the	  primary	  function	  of	  exposing	  us	  to	  alternative	  viewpoints	  
such	  that	  serious	  consideration	  of	  them	  will	  potentially	  help	  improve	  our	  epistemic	  
standing.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  instrumental	  in	  increasing	  the	  
number	  of	  true	  beliefs	  which	  we	  hold	  and	  improving	  the	  proportion	  of	  true	  to	  false	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beliefs.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  truth-­‐conducive	  in	  another	  important	  respect.	  As	  Linda	  
Zagzebski	  points	  out,	  “we	  may	  legitimately	  call	  a	  trait	  or	  procedure	  truth	  conducive	  
if	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  advancing	  knowledge…”	  (1996,	  p.	  182).4	  Although	  
she	  has	  such	  traits	  as	  creativity	  and	  inventiveness	  in	  mind,	  I	  think	  this	  alternative	  
sense	  of	  truth-­‐conduciveness	  can	  also	  be	  extended	  to	  apply	  to	  open-­‐mindedness.	  To	  
see	  how,	  think	  of	  the	  characteristic	  behavior	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  closed-­‐minded.	  This	  
is	  someone	  who	  is	  unwilling	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  novel	  viewpoint,	  either	  by	  refusing	  
to	  make	  room	  for	  it	  in	  her	  cognitive	  space	  for	  any	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  cognitive	  
activities,	  or	  in	  the	  event	  that	  she	  does,	  by	  not	  giving	  it	  serious	  treatment.	  For	  such	  a	  
person,	  the	  gateway	  to	  new	  ideas	  is	  closed,	  and	  the	  prospect	  for	  epistemic	  
betterment	  is	  cut	  off	  altogether.	  To	  advance	  knowledge	  for	  such	  a	  person,	  it	  is	  
necessary	  that	  she	  engages.	  	  
If	  engagement	  is	  the	  conceptual	  core	  of	  open-­‐mindedness,	  what	  role	  is	  there	  
for	  cognitive	  transcendence	  or	  fallibilism	  to	  play?	  I	  have	  already	  suggested	  that	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Recently,	  some	  philosophers	  have	  argued	  that	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  not	  truth-­‐
conducive	  in	  the	  first	  sense	  (e.g.,	  Cohen	  2009;	  Carter	  and	  Gordon	  2014;	  also	  see	  
Montmarquet	  1993,	  chapter	  2).	  Noting	  that	  the	  connection	  between	  open-­‐
mindedness	  and	  truth	  is	  at	  best	  tenuous,	  Carter	  and	  Gordon,	  for	  instance,	  argue	  that	  
the	  character	  trait	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  intellectual	  virtue	  only	  if	  it	  is	  connected	  
with	  some	  epistemic	  end	  other	  than	  truth,	  such	  as	  understanding	  and	  wisdom.	  It	  is	  
beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  assess	  this	  issue	  in	  detail.	  My	  view	  is	  that	  some	  of	  
these	  challenges	  can	  plausibly	  be	  met.	  For	  example,	  as	  I	  just	  noted,	  Zagzebski’s	  
alternative	  sense	  of	  truth-­‐conduciveness	  can	  be	  adapted	  as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  
Carter	  and	  Gordon	  (her	  discussion	  of	  the	  “Generality	  Problem”	  is	  also	  pertinent	  
(1996,	  especially	  sections	  4.1.2	  and	  4.1.3)).	  Indeed,	  she	  is	  careful	  to	  note	  that	  a	  trait	  
can	  still	  be	  truth-­‐conducive	  in	  this	  alternative	  sense	  “…	  even	  though	  it	  generates	  
very	  few	  true	  beliefs	  and	  even	  if	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  the	  beliefs	  formed	  as	  the	  result	  
of	  this	  trait	  or	  procedure	  are	  false”	  (p.	  182).	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  
continue	  to	  assume,	  as	  Riggs	  and	  Baehr	  do,	  that	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  truth-­‐
conducive.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  also	  connected	  to	  other	  cognitive	  
goods	  (e.g.,	  understanding)	  that	  further	  contribute	  to	  its	  status	  as	  an	  intellectual	  
virtue.	  My	  discussion	  of	  Riggs’s	  motivation	  problem	  below	  will	  highlight	  this	  point.	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should	  think	  of	  cognitive	  transcendence	  as	  a	  means	  or	  mechanism	  by	  which	  one	  can	  
come	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  novel	  idea	  or	  argument.	  In	  cases	  where	  one’s	  beliefs	  are	  
especially	  entrenched	  or	  firmly	  held,	  it	  may	  certainly	  be	  beneficial	  to	  transcend	  one’s	  
default	  standpoint	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  or	  see	  the	  merit	  of	  a	  different	  standpoint.	  
As	  mentioned,	  a	  socially	  privileged	  person	  may	  need	  to	  set	  aside	  her	  usual	  way	  of	  
thinking	  about	  class,	  power	  and	  entitlements,	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  
hardships	  of	  marginalized	  groups.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  means	  by	  which	  one	  can	  
engage,	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  necessary	  one.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  below,	  there	  are	  other	  means	  for	  
one	  to	  employ	  to	  engage	  with	  new	  ideas	  without	  having	  to	  set	  aside	  or	  suspend	  
one’s	  standpoint.	  As	  for	  Riggs’s	  conditions	  for	  open-­‐mindedness,	  I	  propose	  that	  we	  
think	  of	  them	  rather	  as	  reasons	  for	  engagement.	  Having	  a	  second-­‐order	  awareness	  
of	  one’s	  fallibility	  can	  certainly	  explain	  why	  a	  person	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  take	  
challenges	  to	  her	  beliefs	  seriously.	  But	  such	  awareness	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  explain	  
why	  a	  person	  with	  firm	  beliefs	  takes	  challenges	  seriously.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  below,	  she	  
may	  have	  other	  reasons	  for	  engaging	  with	  challenges	  to	  her	  own	  views,	  reasons	  that	  
need	  not	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  her	  status	  as	  a	  believer	  or	  with	  her	  cognitive	  
weaknesses.	  To	  explain	  this,	  of	  course,	  is	  also	  to	  show	  how	  my	  view	  can	  satisfy	  
Riggs’s	  desideratum	  (specifically,	  to	  resolve	  the	  two	  aforementioned	  problems).	  
Let	  us	  first	  take	  what	  has	  been	  identified	  above	  as	  the	  compatibility	  problem.	  
Recall	  Riggs’s	  puzzle	  about	  a	  person	  having	  a	  firm	  belief	  in	  p	  but	  willing,	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  it.	  As	  we	  noted	  earlier,	  Riggs’s	  solution	  is	  to	  construe	  
open-­‐mindedness	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  having	  doubts	  about	  p	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  one’s	  self-­‐
awareness	  of	  one’s	  epistemic	  fallibility	  (i.e.,	  a	  recognition	  that	  one	  could	  have	  made	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a	  mistake	  in	  arriving	  at	  p).	  In	  this	  manner,	  one	  can	  maintain	  a	  firm	  belief	  in	  p	  but	  is	  
prepared	  to	  take	  challenges	  to	  p	  seriously.	  By	  contrast,	  there	  is	  an	  alternative	  
explanation	  of	  how	  an	  agent	  can	  be	  open-­‐minded	  about	  her	  firm	  belief	  p.	  The	  
strategy	  is	  to	  find	  a	  way	  for	  her	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  opposing	  viewpoint	  while	  leaving	  
her	  epistemic	  commitment	  to	  p	  intact.	  Here	  is	  one	  scenario	  of	  such	  a	  possibility:	  The	  
agent	  can	  engage	  with	  not-­‐p	  by	  trying	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  is	  false.5	  That	  is,	  she	  can	  
make	  room	  for	  it	  in	  her	  cognitive	  space	  with	  the	  specific	  aim	  of	  showing	  that	  in	  light	  
of	  her	  current	  beliefs,	  it	  cannot	  be	  true.	  She	  can	  even	  do	  this	  with	  the	  initial	  mindset	  
and	  conviction	  that	  p	  is	  true.	  Indeed,	  her	  unwavering	  confidence	  in	  p	  at	  the	  outset	  
convinces	  her	  that	  not-­‐p	  can	  only	  be	  false.	  Armed	  with	  this	  confidence,	  she	  goes	  
about	  finding	  reasons	  to	  reject	  not-­‐p.	  An	  example	  will	  be	  instructive.	  
Imagine	  a	  philosophy	  professor	  who	  has	  devoted	  much	  of	  his	  long	  career	  
developing	  and	  defending	  materialist	  theories	  of	  the	  mind.	  One	  day,	  he	  attends	  a	  
talk	  by	  a	  colleague	  who	  is	  an	  advocate	  of	  substance	  dualism,	  and	  learns	  about	  a	  new	  
argument	  with	  a	  conclusion	  (not-­‐p)	  that	  negates	  a	  central	  materialist	  tenet	  (p)	  that	  
he	  holds	  strongly.6	  A	  confirmed	  materialist,	  he	  reacts	  immediately	  to	  the	  argument	  
by	  dismissing	  it	  as	  neither	  valid	  nor	  threatening,	  just	  as	  he	  would	  to	  any	  argument	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  One	  way	  in	  which	  she	  might	  carry	  out	  this	  task	  is	  to	  use	  the	  method	  of	  indirect	  
proof	  or	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum:	  she	  assumes	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  she	  
seeks	  to	  reject	  (e.g.,	  not-­‐p)	  by	  attempting	  to	  draw	  a	  contradiction	  from	  it.	  
6	  It	  is	  worth	  emphasizing	  that	  this	  opposing	  argument	  must	  be	  recognized	  by	  the	  
professor	  to	  be	  novel	  in	  some	  non-­‐trivial	  respect.	  This	  condition	  is	  built	  into	  the	  
definition	  and	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  open-­‐mindedness	  to	  be	  applicable.	  If	  the	  
opposing	  argument	  is	  one	  with	  which	  the	  professor	  is	  already	  familiar	  and	  to	  which	  
he	  has	  previously	  given	  serious	  consideration,	  he	  need	  not	  engage	  with	  it;	  to	  do	  so	  
would	  be	  a	  waste	  of	  both	  his	  time	  and	  effort.	  Moreover,	  his	  lack	  of	  engagement	  with	  
a	  previously	  considered	  idea	  is	  not	  an	  instance	  of	  his	  failing	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded,	  but	  
one	  to	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  open-­‐mindedness	  does	  not	  apply.	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that	  presupposes	  or	  originates	  from	  substance	  dualism.	  He	  wants	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  argument	  is	  invalid	  or	  flawed.	  This	  is	  not	  because	  he	  suddenly	  
has	  doubts	  about	  his	  materialist	  tenet.	  In	  fact,	  he	  continues	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  
unassailable	  and	  take	  its	  truth	  for	  granted;	  the	  need	  to	  determine	  whether	  his	  
colleague’s	  objection	  is	  faulty	  or	  not	  never	  even	  crosses	  his	  mind.	  What	  explains	  his	  
willingness	  to	  take	  his	  colleague’s	  polemical	  viewpoint	  seriously	  is	  that	  he	  is	  
motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  find	  out	  how	  or	  where	  exactly	  this	  new	  novel	  viewpoint	  
goes	  wrong,	  and	  to	  acquire	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  debate.	  In	  addition,	  he	  
considers	  it	  good	  epistemic	  exercise	  to	  defend	  his	  own	  views	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
challenges,	  even	  if	  he	  does	  not	  think	  much	  of	  so-­‐called	  challenges.	  The	  professor	  
thus	  sets	  out	  to	  deal	  with	  his	  colleague’s	  opposing	  viewpoint.	  
What	  this	  example	  demonstrates	  is	  that	  there	  are	  alternative	  ways	  to	  explain	  
how	  a	  person	  with	  cherished	  beliefs	  can	  take	  challenges	  seriously.	  The	  professor	  
can	  engage	  with	  his	  colleague’s	  objection	  (not-­‐p)	  with	  an	  unwavering	  confidence	  in	  
the	  truth	  of	  his	  firmly	  held	  philosophical	  tenet	  (p).	  More	  importantly,	  what	  explains	  
his	  willingness	  to	  engage	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  considerations	  related	  to	  his	  
fallibilism	  as	  a	  believer	  or	  his	  cognitive	  weaknesses.	  Rather,	  it	  has	  everything	  to	  do	  
with	  his	  desire	  for	  new	  truths	  and	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  debate,	  and	  to	  
keep	  up	  the	  epistemic	  maintenance	  of	  his	  beliefs.	  Indeed,	  there	  are	  still	  other	  ways	  
in	  which	  the	  professor	  can	  engage.	  The	  example	  can	  be	  modified	  to	  accommodate	  
the	  following,	  so	  that	  the	  professor	  can	  try	  (1)	  to	  analyze	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  
objection	  makes	  a	  subtle,	  though	  innovative,	  move	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  
supervenience;	  (2)	  to	  get	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  how	  his	  tenet	  can	  be	  a	  response	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to	  certain	  issues	  that	  arise	  from	  substance	  dualism;	  (3)	  to	  analyze	  not	  the	  content,	  
but	  the	  form	  or	  style,	  of	  the	  argument	  behind	  the	  objection;	  (4)	  to	  study	  the	  
objection	  so	  as	  to	  find	  additional	  ways	  to	  buttress	  his	  already	  strong	  belief	  in	  the	  
tenet.	  All	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  engagement	  are	  examples	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  can	  take	  
an	  opposing	  argument	  seriously	  without	  yielding	  an	  inch	  of	  one’s	  ground.	  Moreover,	  
an	  appeal	  to	  any	  of	  these	  will	  similarly	  explain	  the	  professor’s	  willingness	  to	  engage	  
with	  the	  objection.	  As	  in	  the	  original	  example,	  he	  will	  do	  so	  with	  an	  unwavering	  
confidence	  in	  his	  tenet.	  Contrary	  to	  Riggs,	  then,	  an	  agent’s	  awareness	  of	  his	  own	  
fallibilism	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  accounting	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  firm	  but	  open-­‐
minded	  believer.	  
There	  is	  a	  likely	  objection	  to	  this	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  I	  just	  noted	  that	  
the	  agent’s	  willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  not-­‐p	  can	  be	  partly	  related	  to	  her	  unwavering	  
confidence	  in	  p.	  However,	  this	  seems	  counter-­‐intuitive:	  How	  can	  a	  person	  with	  an	  
unshaken	  confidence	  in	  her	  belief	  be	  regarded	  as	  open-­‐minded?	  Does	  such	  a	  
confidence	  not	  suggest	  that	  her	  mind	  is	  already	  closed	  to	  all	  pertinent	  novel	  
viewpoints?	  I	  do	  not	  think	  so.	  First,	  her	  unshaken	  confidence	  would	  amount	  to	  
closed-­‐mindedness	  if	  it	  prevented	  her	  altogether	  from	  entertaining	  the	  novel	  
standpoint,	  or	  considering	  it	  seriously.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  the	  
professor,	  as	  he	  is	  still	  willing	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  argument	  despite	  his	  confidence.	  
Second,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  time	  and	  stage	  when	  the	  agent	  exhibits	  this	  
confidence	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  she	  is	  responsive	  to	  reason.	  So	  far,	  I	  have	  been	  
careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  agent	  displays	  such	  confidence	  only	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  her	  
engagement	  with	  not-­‐p.	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  being	  unwaveringly	  confident	  about	  p	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is	  not	  necessarily	  incompatible	  with	  engaging	  with	  not-­‐p	  seriously.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
agent	  need	  not	  remain	  so	  firm	  through	  the	  entire	  time	  she	  engages	  with	  not-­‐p.	  Thus,	  
returning	  to	  the	  above	  example,	  in	  trying	  to	  refute	  the	  substance	  dualism	  argument,	  
the	  professor	  may	  discover,	  to	  his	  surprise,	  that	  his	  existing	  beliefs	  and	  arguments	  
actually	  fall	  short	  of	  the	  task.7	  He	  may	  be	  unable	  to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  critical	  parts	  
of	  the	  argument	  or	  may	  realize	  that	  certain	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  it	  bring	  out	  a	  
contradiction	  or	  inconsistency	  in	  his	  own	  beliefs	  that	  has	  hitherto	  eluded	  him.	  If	  the	  
professor	  is	  rational	  or	  possesses	  other	  intellectual	  character	  virtues	  that	  render	  
him	  careful,	  attentive,	  objective	  and	  rigorous,	  then	  he	  will	  respond	  accordingly.	  He	  
will	  have	  to	  declare	  his	  attempt	  to	  reject	  the	  argument	  a	  failure	  and	  either	  to	  
suspend	  or	  give	  up	  his	  materialist	  tenet	  or	  to	  accept	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  opposing	  
argument	  as	  true.	  Conversely,	  if	  he	  does	  not	  encounter	  any	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  
obstacles	  in	  his	  inquiry,	  his	  confidence	  will	  be	  reinforced	  and	  remain	  steadfast.	  
Either	  way,	  the	  professor’s	  willingness	  to	  engage	  seriously	  with	  the	  argument	  
reflects	  his	  open-­‐mindedness.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Here,	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  the	  professor’s	  open-­‐mindedness	  consists	  in	  his	  
realization	  that	  he	  is	  unable	  to	  meet	  the	  objection,	  and	  thus,	  his	  eventual	  acceptance	  
of	  the	  opposing	  standpoint.	  He	  would	  equally	  be	  deemed	  open-­‐minded	  even	  if	  he	  
had	  the	  resources	  to	  expose	  the	  argument	  based	  on	  substance	  dualism	  as	  fallacious.	  
What	  matters	  is	  that	  he	  has	  given	  the	  argument	  serious	  consideration.	  It	  is	  therefore	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  a	  person’s	  being	  open-­‐minded	  about	  some	  novel	  viewpoint	  is	  
neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  he	  does	  with	  it	  after	  serious	  consideration.	  (i.e.,	  
whether	  he	  subsequently	  accepts	  or	  rejects	  it	  (Kwong	  forthcoming)).	  Rather,	  the	  
professor’s	  open-­‐mindedness	  consists	  principally	  in	  his	  willingness	  in	  the	  first	  place	  
to	  put	  himself	  in	  a	  position	  so	  that	  he	  can	  make	  such	  a	  determination.	  Again,	  note	  
that	  he	  could	  have	  easily	  refused	  to	  engage	  at	  all	  with	  the	  opposing	  argument	  on	  the	  
principle	  that	  it	  is	  based	  on	  substance	  dualism.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  he	  would	  
undoubtedly	  be	  regarded	  as	  closed-­‐minded.	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What	  this	  response	  to	  the	  likely	  objection	  shows	  is	  that	  there	  is	  allowance	  in	  
my	  view	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  change	  her	  mind	  at	  a	  subsequent	  time.	  The	  objection	  holds	  
only	  if	  the	  agent’s	  grip	  on	  her	  beliefs	  is	  unresponsive	  to	  reason	  and	  remains	  
steadfast	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  critical	  challenge.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  agent,	  I	  submit,	  is	  
no	  longer	  seriously	  engaged	  in	  her	  consideration	  of	  not-­‐p.	  Even	  though	  she	  initially	  
invited	  the	  novel	  viewpoint	  into	  her	  cognitive	  space,	  she	  has	  since	  ceased	  to	  be	  
open-­‐minded	  about	  it.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  suggested,	  this	  need	  not	  be	  so:	  it	  is	  
possible	  that	  while	  engaging	  with	  not-­‐p,	  she	  may	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  her	  resources	  
are	  insufficient	  for	  rejecting	  it	  and	  hence,	  she	  has	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  she	  is	  not	  up	  
to	  the	  task	  or	  that	  not-­‐p	  is	  true	  (or	  conversely,	  p	  is	  false).	  To	  return	  to	  an	  earlier	  
point,	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  this	  latter	  possibility	  of	  revising	  one’s	  existing	  views,	  
that	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  truth-­‐conducive,	  and	  can,	  therefore,	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  
intellectual	  virtue.	  And	  it	  is	  worth	  emphasizing	  again	  that	  what	  enables	  the	  agent	  to	  
be	  in	  a	  position	  where	  she	  might	  increase	  her	  chance	  of	  gaining	  knowledge	  or	  true	  
beliefs	  (or	  of	  eliminating	  false	  ones)	  is	  her	  willingness	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  make	  
room	  in	  her	  cognitive	  space	  for	  novel	  ideas	  and	  to	  consider	  them	  seriously.	  It	  is	  this	  
willingness	  to	  engage	  that	  I	  argue	  constitutes	  her	  open-­‐mindedness.	  If	  the	  professor	  
has	  not	  done	  so	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  challenges	  his	  tenet	  or	  if	  his	  steadfast	  grip	  
on	  his	  tenet	  prevents	  him	  from	  engaging	  with	  the	  argument,	  he	  will	  not	  come	  to	  see	  
that	  the	  tenet	  he	  holds	  so	  firmly	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  be	  true.	  His	  close-­‐mindedness,	  in	  
other	  words,	  will	  shut	  him	  out	  from	  the	  opportunity	  to	  improve	  his	  epistemic	  status.	  	  
Incidentally,	  this	  last	  point	  also	  helps	  to	  clarify	  what	  has	  been	  called	  above	  
the	  motivational	  problem	  (Riggs),	  namely,	  why	  we	  would	  want	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded,	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or	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  account,	  why	  we	  would	  want	  to	  engage.	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  our	  
willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  novel	  ideas	  places	  us	  in	  a	  position	  such	  that	  we	  increase	  
our	  chances	  of	  exposing	  our	  mistaken	  beliefs	  and	  of	  getting	  to	  the	  truth.	  But	  there	  
are	  two	  problems	  with	  this	  answer.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  quite	  complete	  or	  inclusive	  
enough,	  for	  it	  is	  derived	  solely	  from	  those	  forms	  of	  engagement	  that	  take	  shape	  as	  
responses	  to	  challenges	  (or,	  as	  Baehr	  puts	  it,	  “conflicts”),	  with	  truth	  as	  the	  cognitive	  
aim.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  other	  forms	  of	  engagement	  that	  do	  not	  have	  an	  explicit	  tie	  to	  truth	  
are	  overlooked,	  and	  their	  epistemic	  values	  or	  goods,	  ignored.	  Second,	  this	  answer	  
does	  not	  help	  to	  address	  “the	  other	  variety”	  of	  the	  motivational	  problem,	  namely,	  
why	  an	  “otherwise	  epistemically	  virtuous	  believer”	  would	  want	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  
(p.	  178).	  	  
Fortunately,	  the	  two	  problems	  are	  connected:	  resolving	  one	  will	  help	  resolve	  
the	  other.	  The	  forms	  of	  engagement	  that	  have	  been	  overlooked,	  at	  least	  in	  
addressing	  why	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  an	  intellectual	  virtue,	  include	  cognitive	  
activities	  that	  are	  typically	  subsumed	  under	  “understanding”.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  
example	  of	  the	  philosophy	  professor,	  one	  of	  his	  reasons	  for	  wanting	  to	  take	  the	  
counterargument	  seriously	  is	  to	  get	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  conceptual	  map	  
where	  the	  debate	  is	  located.	  He	  can	  do	  this,	  say,	  by	  trying	  to	  draw	  contrast	  and	  
comparison	  between	  the	  concepts	  and	  assumptions	  of	  his	  tenet	  and	  those	  in	  the	  
counterargument.	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  understanding,	  as	  Zagzebski	  and	  others	  
have	  argued,	  is	  a	  distinct	  epistemic	  value	  or	  cognitive	  good	  from	  truth	  in	  its	  own	  
right	  (e.g.,	  Grimm	  2011,	  Kvanvig	  2003,	  Zagzebski	  2001)	  and	  need	  not	  be	  in	  the	  
service	  of	  other	  values	  or	  goods.	  Assuming	  that	  this	  is	  correct,	  another	  reason	  why	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we	  should	  want	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  is	  to	  increase	  our	  understanding	  by	  engaging	  
with	  novel	  ideas.	  The	  willingness	  to	  do	  so,	  depending	  on	  the	  form	  of	  engagement	  or	  
cognitive	  activity	  prescribed	  by	  the	  context,	  can	  be	  a	  reliable	  way	  of	  deepening	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  at	  hand.	  	  
Once	  we	  acknowledge	  this,	  we	  can	  explain	  why	  someone	  who	  is	  an	  
“otherwise	  virtuous	  believer”	  should	  want	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded.	  Although	  this	  person	  
may	  have	  “every	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  her	  own	  views	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  true	  
than	  any	  other	  views	  she	  is	  likely	  to	  find	  represented	  among	  those	  around	  her”	  
(Riggs,	  p.	  178),	  she	  can	  still	  find	  room	  for	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  issues	  and	  
debates	  pertinent	  to	  her	  own	  views.	  No	  one,	  not	  even	  someone	  who	  consistently	  
and	  successfully	  practices	  all	  (however	  defined)	  of	  the	  intellectual	  virtues,	  can	  claim	  
to	  have	  a	  complete	  understanding	  (whatever	  this	  may	  amount	  to)	  of	  the	  things	  
about	  which	  she	  has	  ideas	  or	  beliefs.	  What	  she	  can	  gain	  from	  being	  open-­‐minded	  is	  
an	  expansion	  of	  various	  kinds	  of	  connections	  between	  her	  existing	  beliefs	  and	  novel	  
ideas.	  The	  exercise	  will	  result	  in	  her	  better	  ‘grasp’	  of	  the	  concepts	  involved.	  
I	  will	  conclude	  this	  section	  by	  following	  up	  on	  an	  earlier	  note.	  I	  mentioned	  
that	  contrary	  to	  Baehr,	  what	  is	  central	  to	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  not	  an	  agent’s	  ability	  
to	  transcend	  her	  default	  cognitive	  standpoint,	  but	  her	  willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  
novel	  ideas.	  I	  suggested	  that	  we	  should	  think	  of	  cognitive	  transcendence	  as	  a	  means	  
or	  mechanism	  for	  such	  an	  engagement,	  while	  allowing	  that	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  
do	  so.	  Notice	  that	  the	  same	  arguments	  used	  to	  show	  how	  my	  account	  can	  satisfy	  
Riggs’s	  desideratum	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  
detach	  or	  transcend	  her	  default	  cognitive	  position	  in	  order	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded.	  What	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the	  arguments	  demonstrate	  is	  that	  an	  agent	  need	  not	  always	  set	  aside	  or	  loosen	  her	  
grip	  on	  her	  conviction	  in	  order	  to	  take	  the	  novel	  viewpoint	  seriously.	  Indeed,	  as	  in	  
the	  example	  of	  the	  philosophy	  professor,	  initial	  conviction	  may	  even	  help	  to	  initiate	  
one’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  opposing	  view	  and	  need	  not	  stand	  in	  one’s	  way	  of	  taking	  
it	  seriously.	  Notice	  that	  in	  my	  view,	  if	  an	  agent	  is	  to	  change	  her	  mind	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
her	  deliberation,	  it	  will	  not	  have	  to	  be	  a	  function	  of	  her	  setting	  aside	  or	  loosening	  
her	  grip	  on	  her	  beliefs.	  Rather,	  it	  can	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  her	  recognition,	  from	  her	  
own	  standpoint,	  of	  the	  deficiency	  of	  her	  beliefs	  (or	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  opposing	  
viewpoint).	  But	  more	  importantly,	  what	  allows	  her	  the	  opportunity	  for	  such	  a	  
recognition	  or	  realization	  in	  the	  first	  place	  is	  her	  effort	  to	  make	  room	  for	  not-­‐p	  in	  her	  
cognitive	  space	  and	  to	  give	  it	  serious	  consideration.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  engagement	  –	  
rather	  than	  Baehr’s	  requirement	  of	  cognitive	  transcendence	  –	  that	  constitutes	  the	  
heart	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	  
Here	  is	  an	  alternative	  way	  to	  establish	  that	  engagement,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
cognitive	  transcendence,	  is	  central	  to	  open-­‐mindedness.	  Suppose	  the	  philosophy	  
professor	  becomes	  aware	  of	  a	  novel	  argument	  that	  challenges	  a	  cherished	  tenet	  of	  
his.	  Given	  his	  desire	  for	  new	  truths	  and	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  debate	  
involving	  this	  tenet,	  he	  decides	  to	  look	  into	  the	  argument.	  After	  carefully	  examining	  
it,	  he	  senses	  that	  he	  does	  not	  quite	  fully	  comprehend	  it	  though	  he	  cannot	  pinpoint	  
where	  exactly	  he	  is	  having	  difficulties.	  So	  he	  seeks	  out	  advice	  from	  his	  colleagues,	  
who	  in	  turn	  make	  him	  see	  that	  his	  failure	  to	  grasp	  the	  argument	  is	  due	  to	  an	  
entrenched	  assumption	  that	  he	  holds.	  Wanting	  to	  understand	  the	  argument,	  he	  
therefore	  detaches	  himself	  from	  this	  assumption	  and	  proceeds	  to	  examine	  the	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argument	  in	  a	  new	  light.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  professor	  decides	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  his	  
serious	  consideration	  that	  he	  needs	  to	  modify	  his	  approach.	  But	  notice	  that	  it	  is	  
extremely	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  the	  professor	  is	  already	  being	  open-­‐minded	  before	  
he	  decides	  to	  transcend	  his	  default	  viewpoint.	  In	  fact,	  if	  what	  I	  am	  arguing	  is	  correct,	  
his	  open-­‐mindedness	  can	  be	  located	  in	  his	  initial	  willingness	  to	  consider	  a	  viewpoint	  
contrary	  to	  his	  own	  and	  in	  his	  subsequent	  attempt	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  task	  seriously.	  
Indeed,	  it	  is	  precisely	  due	  to	  his	  commitment	  to	  give	  it	  serious	  consideration	  that	  
leads	  him	  to	  detach	  from	  his	  entrenched	  assumption.	  What	  this	  shows,	  then,	  is	  that	  if	  
transcendence	  is	  involved	  at	  all,	  it	  is	  brought	  about	  by	  engagement.	  Again,	  
engagement	  constitutes	  the	  heart	  of	  open-­‐mindedness.	  	  
	  
4.	  Conclusion	  
In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  open-­‐mindedness	  ought	  to	  be	  construed	  in	  
terms	  of	  engagement.	  On	  this	  view,	  a	  person	  is	  open-­‐minded	  when	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  
engage	  with	  a	  novel	  idea,	  that	  is,	  when	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  make	  room	  for	  it	  in	  her	  
cognitive	  space	  and	  to	  give	  it	  serious	  consideration.	  I	  argue	  that	  engagement,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  cognitive	  transcendence	  or	  an	  agent’s	  awareness	  of	  her	  fallibilism,	  is	  
what	  is	  central	  to	  open-­‐mindedness,	  and	  is	  principally	  responsible	  for	  making	  open-­‐
mindedness	  an	  intellectual	  virtue.	  Lastly,	  I	  show	  how	  construing	  open-­‐mindedness	  
in	  terms	  of	  engagement	  has	  the	  merit	  of	  satisfying	  both	  Baehr’s	  and	  Riggs’s	  
desiderata:	  it	  can	  account	  for	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  examples	  of	  open-­‐mindedness,	  and	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explain	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  open-­‐minded	  while	  holding	  firm	  beliefs	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